PG&E Grilled About Memo Discouraging Use of Automatic Shutoff Valves

WASHINGTON—PG&E’s policy to not install remote or automatic shutoff valves on its pipelines was based solely on input from other pipeline operators, despite a previous federal study that recommended the valves be installed on Line 132 and similar gas transmission lines, PG&E officials said today on the first day of the NTSB’s hearing on the Sept. 9 pipeline explosion.

The utility’s decision to delay installing on before the Crestmoor disaster relied on findings from a 2006 internal memo that claimed the valves had limitations in preventing significant damage if an explosion occurred.

It took a PG&E crew more than an hour and a half to shut off the pipe on Sept. 9 because the line had manual valves. By that time, the fire had already claimed the lives of several residents, dozens of others had been injured and more than 30 homes had been destroyed in the neighborhood.

The 2006 PG&E memo (see attached) became a point of contention throughout most of the morning.

In testifying before technical experts from the National Transportation Safety Board, Chin-hung Lee, the senior consulting gas engineer who wrote the 2006 memo, said the other pipeline industry studies concluded that most damage after a pipeline explosion happens within the first 30 seconds and that using automatic or remote shutoff valves in densely populated areas such as the Crestmoor neighborhood would have “little or no effect on increasing human safety or protecting properties” following an explosion. 

That conclusion was used by the utility in determining the operation of Line 132, despite a finding in a 1999 Department of Transportation study that said remote controlled valves were reliable.

Lee, however, couldn’t provide a conclusive answer about how the valves work, and he provided conflicting answers—often fumbling over his words—about how long it would take crews to shut down a pipe if remote or automatic shutoff valves were installed, showing the possible inconclusiveness of the industry studies that his memo relied upon.

Edward Salas, PG&E’s senior vice president of engineering and operations, chimed in to provide more explanation.

“In theory, if remote valves were close to the site, they would have worked,” Salas said. “It really depends on where the valves are in relation to the rupture site. We don’t have the analysis yet from the investigation to determine what the impact would have been.”

Following PG&E’s testimony, Congresswoman Jackie Speier, who was sitting in the audience during the hearing, said she found the utility’s stance on remote and automatic shutoff valves “preposterous.”

“It’s frightening to me to think that’s the kind of analysis that PG&E would engage in in making an assessment on safety because we all know the industry is always going to spin it slightly differently,” said Speier, who has introduced a bill, the , that would require pipeline operators throughout the country to comply with new requirements for installing automatic shutoff valves on all pipelines. 

The NTSB’s scrutiny of PG&E’s pipeline operations was incessant throughout the rest of the day.

Investigators spent a significant amount of time dissecting the events that led up to the explosion, including inaccuracies in PG&E’s operating pressure data, how the welds on the pipeline were manufactured and what steps the utility took to scrutinize its integrity management program. 

Documents released today also showed that while PG&E was aware of the fire as early as 6:18pm on the night of the explosion after gas pressure on Line 132 plunged earlier in the day—PG&E's dispatch center sent an off-duty employee to investigate the report of the fire, but he wasn't qualified to operate the manual valves to shut off the pipe's gas—and while two off-duty PG&E employees had arrived at the scene of the explosion at 6:41pm, it wasn’t until 6:56pm—nearly 45 minutes after the explosion—that anyone called 9-1-1 about the fire. 

City Manager Connie Jackson asked PG&E officials whether they would consider establishing a communication plan with emergency personnel if a significant accident happened again. 

Salas said establishing a communication plan was something that could be considered. 

Additionally, PG&E officials were again stumped when questioned about how the section of pipe that exploded was built. 

In a , the NTSB said it found a number of defective welds on the section of pipe that exploded—a pipe installed in 1956 that PG&E originally reported as seamless and investigators later found to have been welded together with a number of longitudinal seams. 

When asked to provide more details about why the pipe was manufactured using longitudinal seam welds, Bob Fassett, PG&E’s director of integrity management and technical support, said it was still unclear from records how the pipeline was built. 

However, he said he believed the crews that installed the pipe were not at fault. 

“There’s a picture in one of the exhibits taken close to 1956 where in the background you can see full-length pieces of pipe,” Fassett said. “The pups (smaller sections of pipe) on the segment lead me to believe they weren’t manufactured in the field.” 

The next part of the NTSB’s hearing will continue Wednesday, when Fire Chief Dennis Haag is expected to testify on behalf of the city and NTSB investigators and officials are expected to question the representatives from the California Public Utilities Commission and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration about state and federal oversight of gas pipelines.