NTSB: Fire Can't Be Described as Anomaly

Updated 12:55 p.m.

In its hearing today on the cause of the Sept. 9 pipeline explosion, the National Transportation Safety Board has been recapping the problems with PG&E’s pipeline system and raising questions that could have a far-reaching impact on the rest of the pipeline industry.

NTSB Chairwoman Deborah Hersman spared no words in castigating PG&E, setting the stage for the safety board’s final report, which is set to be released later today.

“Today, you will hear troubling revelations about a company that exploited weaknesses in a lax system of oversight and government agencies that placed blind trust in operators to the detriment of public safety,” Hersman said in opening the hearing in Washington, D.C.

Throughout most of the morning, investigators have been summarizing the findings that have been discovered since the disaster in the Crestmoor neighborhood.

The following safety problems have been revealed over the course of the investigation:

• multiple deficiencies in PG&E’s operations, such as faulty record-keeping; an incomplete integrity management program, which used a method called direct assessment to inspect its natural gas pipelines (that method, however, is best used to detect corrosion and not flaws in pipeline that have longitudinal seam welds, such as Line 132, the pipeline that ruptured); improper oversight of its SCADA operation and its unorganized emergency response to the disaster

• ineffective federal and state oversight

• inadequate federal pipeline safety rules, which PG&E was able to circumvent because it installed many of its lines before certain policies were established.

During the second part of the hearing, the NTSB board members and investigators spent a while dissecting the poorly built pipeline, Line 132, that exploded on Sept. 9, 2010. That section of pipe near Glenview Drive and Earl Aveneue was comprised of several shorter segments of pipe, known as pups, that were then combined and welded together with longitudianl seams.

Investigators showed that the pipe segment that burst was so poorly welded that it released 47 million cubic-feet of gas, enough to run 1,200 homes for a year.

Investigators also discovered that some of the pipe in that section was manufactured by Consolidated Western, which PG&E has partly blamed for the flawed pipeline. But, to this day, PG&E still doesn't know where parts of Line 132 originated. One of the NTSB board members said that was no reason for PG&E to deflect blame.

"It doesn't matter where the pipe came from," said NTSB board member Robert Sumwalt. "It was PG&E's responsibility to operate it and maintain it."

Board member Mark Rosekind later chimed in and said he refused to believe PG&E's earlier assessment that the Sept. 9 explosion was an anomaly, pointing to two similar PG&E pipeline accidents that have happened over the last 30 years.

"You can't describe the San Bruno fire as an anomaly," Rosekind said. "Maybe the San Francisco fire in 1981, but could this be a harbinger of things to come?" he asked.

After the hearing, Hersman said the following in a statement:

In the pipeline industry, there must be effective oversight and strong enforcement. With integrity management plans, oversight has shifted away from prescriptive regulation to performance
standards. Yet, this approach, where companies effectively say, “These are our standards and we are meeting them,” is only as good as the companies’ commitment and, yes, their integrity. In too
many cases, the regulators didn’t really know what was going on. For example, our investigators and the CPUC were not made aware of a 1988 seam failure on Line 132 until eight months after
the San Bruno accident.

The tragedies in San Bruno, Rancho Cordova, and San Francisco, with their multiple recurring deficiencies over many years, illustrate systemic problems at PG&E.

Ronald Reagan famously said, “Trust, but verify.” For government to do its job — safeguard the public — it cannot trust alone. It must  verify through effective oversight. And as we saw in San Bruno, when the approach to safety is lax, the consequences can be deadly.

Recently, we are seeing a flurry of activity on several fronts to make improvements to better ensure pipeline safety. This is good. But the proof will be in the pudding when solid and lasting improvements are made.

This is why we are issuing strongly worded and tough recommendations on removing grandfather clauses, and requiring remote control valves and in-line inspections. It is also why we have asked the Department of Transportation to assess the effectiveness of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s oversight program and, in turn, the effectiveness of state programs funded with federal dollars. In essence, verify. And, where trust is not merited, make sure the penalty is high.

Because, when there’s an accident like the one in San Bruno, it is too late.

San Bruno Patch will update this story when more information becomes available.